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EXPEDITED APPEALS IN INDIANA: TOO LITTLE, TOO
LATE
Joel M. Schumm*
By court rule, the Indiana Supreme Court requires that
Indiana's appellate courts give "expedited consideration" to
interlocutory appeals and to appeals involving children on issues
such as custody, support, visitation, adoption, and the
termination of parental rights. Although these cases are certainly
worthy of any court's careful and expeditious consideration, the
attempt of the appellate courts in Indiana to address them in an
expedited manner has had little, if any, practical effect.
Moreover, the same rules that expedite consideration of this
somewhat disparate class of cases provide no opportunity for
expedited consideration of the hundreds of other cases,
including the cases of criminal defendants, even those serving a
short sentence that will likely expire before the appellate court
issues an opinion.
Part I of this Article reviews and critiques the existing
procedures in Indiana, including the length of time and the
procedures by which cases make their way to and through the
state's appellate courts. The Article explores the systemic
problems with the purported expedition of cases through specific
examples of recent cases in which reversal did not occur until
several months after the trial court's erroneous ruling. Part II
offers suggestions for improvement: If Indiana is serious about
expediting appeals involving children, the rules could easily be
changed to expedite record preparation and briefing. However,
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Wesleyan University; M.A., 1994, University of Cincinnati; J.D., 1998, Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis. The author is a former law clerk to the Honorable Theodore
R. Boehm, Associate Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court (1998-2000) and the Honorable
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THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 4 No. 1 (Spring 2002)
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
expediting one category of cases necessarily slows the rendering
of decisions in other cases, and thus Indiana should carefully
reevaluate whether any cases should be expedited to the
exclusion of others, or, at a minimum, consider adopting
procedures that more easily allow litigants and the courts to
expedite those cases in which an expedited decision is especially
important and feasible. As a final alternative, Indiana could
easily abandon any notion of expediting appeals and, with a
slight change in the rules for transcript preparation, render
decisions in most cases in the same amount of time that it
currently takes for expedited cases.
I. To EXPEDITE OR NOT TO EXPEDITE, THAT IS THE QUESTION
(WHICH MAKES LITTLE DIFFERENCE)
The Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that the
appellate courts "shall give expedited consideration to
interlocutory appeals and appeals involving issues of child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, paternity, determination
that a child is in need of services, termination of parental rights,
and all other appeals entitled to priority by rule or statute."'
Although this rule requires the appellate court to give expedited
consideration to a case once it arrives at the court, the appellate
rules do very little to get the case to the appellate court
expeditiously.
In Indiana, an aggrieved party initiates an appeal by filing a
Notice of Appeal with the trial court clerk within thirty days
after the entry of a final judgment.2 The trial court clerk then has
thirty days in which to assemble the clerk's record,3 and the
1. Ind. R. App. P. 21(A) (2002). The focus on expedited appeals in Indiana is largely
limited to cases involving children and thus this article does not explore the implications, if
any, for the small number of cases falling under the final part of the rule, which purports to
expedite "all other appeals entitled to priority by rule or statute." For example, Indiana
Code section 35-50-2-9(j) provides that the review of a "death sentence ... shall be given
priority over all other cases," but because of the voluminous record of proceedings in such
cases and the complex and very significant legal issues presented, record preparation and
briefing almost always take considerably longer than in the run-of-the-mill appeal.
Moreover, as recent opinions make clear, the court routinely takes several months, if not
well over a year, to decide these cases.
2. Ind. R. App. P. 9(A)(1) (2002).
3. Ind. R. App. P. 10(B) (2002).
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court reporter has ninety days in which to prepare the transcript
and file it with the trial court clerk.4 The appellant's brief must
be filed within thirty days of the completion of the transcript.5
The appellee's brief is due thirty days after service of the
appellant's brief,6 and the appellant may file a reply brief fifteen
days thereafter.7 Accordingly, if the court reporter and litigants
take full advantage of their allotted time, a case will not arrive at
the appellate court in less than five and a half months.8
These deadlines are the same whether the appeal is from a
final judgment or an interlocutory order, or is an expedited
appeal.9 The only notable distinction among them is that
"[m]otions for extension of time in appeals involving worker's
compensation, issues of child custody, support, visitation,
paternity, adoption, determination that a child is in need of
services, and termination of parental rights shall be granted only
in extraordinary circumstances." 'o Therefore, whereas a typical
expedited appeal will likely arrive at the appellate court in five
and a half months, a typical non-expedited appeal may arrive in
seven to nine months, if the court reporter or one or both parties
seek an extension of time.
Pursuant to Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(A), the
court will then give "expedited consideration" to interlocutory
appeals and appeals involving children, while other cases will be
4. Ind. R. App. P. I I(B) (2002).
5. Ind. R. App. P. 45(B)(1) (2002).
6. Id. 45(B)(2).
7. Id. 45(B)(3).
8. It is possible, but not very likely, that the case could arrive in a shorter period of
time. The appellant could encourage (or apply subtle pressure on) the court reporter to
prepare the transcript in less than ninety days, and the appellant certainly could file his or
her brief in less than thirty days. However, in expedited appeals involving children, there
appears to be no mechanism whereby the appellant could ask the appellate court to require
the court reporter to prepare the transcript in less than ninety days or reduce the number of
days for briefing. Cf. Ind. R. App. P. 14(F)(2) (2002) (allowing the court of appeals to
"shorten any time period" upon motion of a party in an interlocutory appeal).
9. "Appeals Involving Waiver of Parental Consent to Abortion" are governed by
Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 62, which allows a minor or her physician to appeal
the denial of a waiver by filing a written request with the trial court within ten days. A
limited record is then expeditiously prepared, and the supreme court decides the case
"without briefs or oral argument, unless the Court otherwise directs." Ind. R. App. P.
62(E) (2002).
10. Ind. R. App. P. 35(D) (2002). Litigants are reminded of this rule and the court's
intention to adhere to it through a letter from the court administrator.
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decided in due course. Both categories of cases are decided by
either a published opinion or a "not-for-publication
memorandum decision." " Although the court of appeals does
not publish data on the average length of time it takes to issue an
opinion in an expedited case, the average is likely about a
month. 2 This is not a significant difference from the average
disposition time for all cases, which has been in the range of 1.3
to 1.5 months in recent years.' 3 In any event, an opinion does not
become "final" (nor may it be acted upon by the parties or the
trial court) until it is "certified," i.e., until the time has run for
the parties to seek a rehearing in the court of appeals or a
transfer to the supreme court.' 4 This requirement adds at least
thirty additional days.'
5
The net result of these rules is that an expedited appeal is
resolved, at the earliest, more than seven months 6 after the filing
of a Notice of Appeal, while a non-expedited appeal may take a
few months longer. Although well-intentioned, the "expedited"
appeals process appears to have little practical effect. Cases
involving children are certainly important and worthy of
expeditious consideration. Trial court decisions that improperly
grant custody, curtail visitation, or terminate a parent-child
1I. Ind. R. App. P. 65 (2002).
12. This estimate is based on this author's experience as a law clerk at the Indiana
Court of Appeals. In most chambers, an expedited case is assigned to a clerk shortly after
its arrival. That clerk will likely finish the case on which he or she is currently working and
begin work on the expedited case within a few days. Depending on the difficulty of the
expedited case, the clerk will likely submit a draft to the judge approximately a week later,
and the judge could take as little time as a few hours or as long as several days revising and
editing the draft. The draft is then circulated to the other two judges on the panel, who are
informed that the case is an expedited case and are asked to vote as early as possible.
Assuming neither judge seeks substantial revision of the circulated opinion or desires to
write a separate concurring or dissenting opinion, the circulated opinion will likely be
ready for hand-down a few days later. The hand-down procedure, however, occurs in two
stages: First, the opinion is circulated to the entire court; second, approximately seven days
later, it is issued to the parties and the public. The letter from the court administrator states:
"For its part, the Court pledges to decide child related cases within two months after they
are fully briefed and within three months, if the Court hears oral argument."
13. 2000 Indiana Judicial Report vol. 1, at 27 (Div. St. Ct. Admin. 2000). The data is
not average disposition time, but rather "average age of cases pending," which by
inference is a close approximation. Id.
14. Ind. R. App. P. 65(E) (2002).
15. Ind. R. App. P. 54(B), 57(C) (2002) (allowing thirty days in which to file a petition
for rehearing or a petition to transfer).
16. But see supra n. 8.
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relationship are decisions that have a significant impact on
children, who are helpless to do anything about them. 7 If the
trial court makes a mistake, it is a very serious one-and one
that should be corrected as soon as possible.
A few recent cases highlight the magnitude of what is at
stake and why any delay, let alone a delay of seven or more
months, should be a serious concern in any scheme purported to
expedite appeals involving children. In Kirk v. Kirk,9 the trial
court denied, on January 16, 2001, a father's petition for change
of custody from the mother and granted him very limited
visitation. ° Ten and a half months later, on December 5, 2001,21
the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, explaining, "The
voluminous evidence leads unerringly to but one conclusion:
that there has been a substantial negative change in [the child's]
mental health since the last custody determination and that a
change in custody is not only in her best interests but also is
imperative and long overdue."22
In Froelich v. Clark,23 in early July of 2000, the trial court
denied a mother's petition to terminate the paternal
grandmother's guardianship of the mother's then eight-year-old
son.24 Almost eight months later, on February 21, 2001, the court
17. As the letter from the court administrator states, these cases "are disruptive to the
parties and especially unsettling to the children involved. The longer a case pends on
appeal, the greater the disruption and anxiety for the parties."
18. Considering the highly deferential standard of review in these types of cases,
however, reversal is rare. See e.g. M.H.C. v. Hill, 750 N.E.2d 872, 875 (Ind. App. 2001)
("We will not set aside the trial court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship
unless it is clearly erroneous."); Irvin v. Hood, 712 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (Ind. App. 1999)
("We will not disturb the trial court's decision in an adoption proceeding unless the
evidence at trial led to but one conclusion and the trial court reached an opposite
conclusion.").
19. 759 N.E.2d 265 (Ind. App. 2001).
20. Id. at 266.
21. The author's review of the appellate court clerk's docket shows that the delay can
be explained by the following timetable: (1) The appellant waited a full thirty days to file
his notice of appeal; (2) the court reporter took the full ninety days to prepare the
transcript; (3) the appellant then filed his brief twenty-five days later; (4) the appellee was
granted an extension and filed her brief two months later; (5) the appellant filed a reply
brief eleven days later; and (6) the court took nearly two months to issue its opinion.
22. Kirk, 759 N.E.2d at 270.
23. 745 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. App. 2001).
24. The court's opinion does not specify when the trial court ruled. However, the
clerk's docket shows that a praecipe, the precursor to the notice of appeal, was filed on July
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of appeals reversed and ordered that the guardianship be
terminated; it ruled that the trial court had erroneously found
that the presumption in favor of parental custody had been
rebutted! In so doing, the court acknowledged "the upheaval
that a change in custody will undoubtedly cause."26
Finally, in Harris v. Delaware County Division of Family
and Children Services,27 the trial court terminated a father's
parental rights on October 20, 1999, after at hearing at which he
was not present. Over nine months later, on July 26, 2000, the
Indiana Court of Appeals reversed because the Division of
Family and Children had failed to give adequate notice to the
father. 8
In cases involving children, as these cases highlight, a
delay of over seven months is simply unacceptable. A child
whose mental health is being harmed by a custodial parent
should not be forced to wait nearly a year for a change of
custody. Nor should a biological parent have to wait that long to
have her child's grandparent's guardianship terminated and her
custody restored. A parent who did not receive adequate notice
of a termination hearing should not for one day-much less nine
months-be deemed not to be a child's parent. 29 Had each of
these cases been decided two or three months later (along with
the non-expedited appeals), it is difficult to imagine that the
additional period of delay would have had a significantly
different impact on the parties involved. Therefore, one must
seriously question what, if anything, is being accomplished by
Indiana's expedited appeal rules.
In a similar vein, interlocutory appeals, by their very
nature, are cases that involve important issues that must be
resolved expeditiously. The Indiana Rules of Appellate
Procedure allow interlocutory appeals "as a matter of right" in
16, and the notice of appeal was filed on July 31. These documents must be filed within
thirty days of the entry of judgment.
25. Froelich, 745 N.E.2d at 233.
26. Id.
27. 732 N.E.2d 248, 249 (Ind. App. 2000).
28. Id.
29. Even more troubling is the prospect that a stay is not granted in a wrongly decided
termination case, and the child is adopted during the pendency of the appeal. In such cases
the disruption to the child's life (and those of the adoptive and biological parents) would be
unimaginable.
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the following classes of orders: (1) those involving the payment
of money; (2) those compelling execution of a document; (3)
those compelling delivery or assignment of securities or similar
documents; (4) those involving the sale or delivery of possession
of real estate; (5) those involving rulings on preliminary
injunctions; (6) those concerning appointments of receivers; (7)
those involving most writs of habeas corpus; (8) those
concerning transfers of cases; and (9) those involving some
rulings of administrative agencies.3° Other issues may be
pursued as discretionary interlocutory appeals if they are
certified by the trial court and accepted by the court of appeals.'
The criteria for allowing such appeals include: (1) whether
the appellant will suffer substantial expense or injury; (2)
whether the issue is one that involves a substantial question of
law that will provide a more orderly disposition of the case if
resolved early; and (3) whether the remedy of appeal is
otherwise inadequate.32 Forcing a litigant to wait seven or more
months for the execution of a crucial document or to be given
possession of rightfully owned real property, although not as
troubling to most as the effect of the delay in cases involving
children, is no more palatable for the parties involved. More
importantly, as explained in Part I of this Article, the delays in
both categories of cases are almost entirely avoidable.
II. MAKING THE RULES MAKE A DIFFERENCE
In order to more effectively expedite appeals, the Indiana
Supreme Court could amend the appellate rules to require an
expedited schedule for transcript preparation and briefing, as the
state's prior rules required. The appellate rules in place before
2001 required in interlocutory appeals that transcripts be
prepared in thirty days,33 that appellant and appellee briefs be
filed in ten days,34 and that reply briefs be filed in five days.35
Under the old rules, a case reached the appellate court within
30. Ind. R. App. P. 14(A) (2002).
31. Id. 14(B).
32. Id. 14(B)(1)(c).
33. Ind. R. App. P. 3(B) (2000).
34. Ind. R. App. P. 8.1(B) (2000).
35. Id.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
two months, nearly one-third of the time under the current rules.
The change appears to be the result of one of the broad goals of
the new appellate rules-establishing common deadlines for the•• 36
benefit of the occasional appellate practitioner 1-but one must
seriously question whether this goal should trump the competing
goal of shortening the time for processing an appeal,37 especially
when the important interests of a child are at stake. Returning to
these deadlines in interlocutory appeals and requiring that they
be followed in all other expedited appeals would be a significant
stride toward real expedition of these important cases.
It is difficult to envision major opposition to such a change,
save that it would create different deadlines that might confuse
the occasional appellate practitioner. Court reporters and
litigants alike survived under the former rule, and a reversion to
or exj.ansion of it would likely cause little difficulty in most
cases.
However, whenever a court expedites some cases, it
necessarily delays the resolution of the remaining non-expedited
cases. In a simple civil case in which a small sum of money is at
stake, the delay is understandable and no reason for concern.
However, the concern is heightened in other cases, such as
36. See generally George T. Patton, Jr., Recent Developments in Indiana Appellate
Procedure: New Appellate Rules, a Constitutional Amendment, and a Proposal, 33 Ind. L.
Rev. 1275, 1276 (2000) (explaining the proposed benefits of the new rules).
37. Id.
38. There was considerable opposition by court reporters to the adoption of the new
Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure in 2001, but this opposition was based largely on a
perception that more was being required of them and nothing was being given back in
return. If the time for preparation of transcripts in some cases is shortened to thirty days,
court reporters would seemingly be able to put those cases to the front of the line and, if
necessary, request extensions in non-expedited cases. Most transcripts for cases involving
children are based on relatively short hearings, and would not require a lot of effort to
prepare. Although some cases involving the termination of parental rights have lengthy
records of proceedings, most of the record is usually documentary evidence/exhibits and
not in-court testimony that must be transcribed by the court reporter.
The expedited briefing deadlines would seemingly cause little difficulty for the cases
in which trial counsel also serves as appellate counsel or in many cases in which new
appellate counsel is presented with a relatively short record on which to write an appeal of
issues on which the law is well-settled and uncomplicated. Counsel in termination of
parental rights cases, however, will likely find a ten-day limit unsettling considering the
lengthy record that will likely need to be reviewed and the magnitude of the issues at stake.
Because there is no chance to later correct errors or omissions by appellate counsel-such
as through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim or other post-conviction relief claim
in a criminal proceeding-more time should at least be available in these cases.
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criminal cases in which defendants are sentenced to relatively
short jail terms or are near the completion of their sentences. It
is quite possible, if not probable, that they will fully serve their
sentences before the court issues an opinion-if not before their
cases ever reach the appellate court. An appeal bond in a
criminal case is relatively rare," so criminal defendants are
seemingly helpless to do anything but serve their sentences
while patiently waiting for the court to resolve their non-
expedited appeals.4° As recent reversals make clear, the court of
appeals is sometimes left to note that its opinion will likely
result in the "immediate release" of a defendant. 4' Because of
the certification process discussed above, 2 however, the release
in these cases cannot truly be characterized as "immediate."
If changes are to be made to the appellate rules, the Indiana
Supreme Court may well wish to reconsider the categories of
cases most worthy of expedited treatment. Cases involving
children and interlocutory appeals, both of which are covered
under the current rule, are certainly worthy candidates for
meaningful expedited treatment. However, some criminal cases,
especially those in which a defendant is serving a short sentence
or is near the end of his or her sentence, seem equally
meritorious. There may well be other categories of cases or
individual cases worthy of expedited treatment; therefore, one
possible solution would be a flexible approach that allows the
appellant in any case to request, as may currently be done in
interlocutory appeals, that the court of appeals shorten the
allowable time periods for record preparation and the filing ofS 41
briefs.
39. See Tyson v. State, 593 N.E.2d 175, 178 (Ind. 1992) ("The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that there are compelling reasons to allow a guilty defendant to
remain free pending appeal of his conviction.").
40. Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(B) allows a party to file a "motion for
expedited consideration," but the categories listed do not seem to apply to the run-of-the-
mill criminal appeal in which the defendant's sentence will likely be served before
resolution of the appeal.
41. See e.g. Partlow v. Superintendent, 756 N.E.2d 978, 983 (Ind. App. 2001); Biehl v.
State, 738 N.E.2d 337, 341 (Ind. App. 2000).
42. See supra nn. 14-15 and accompanying text.
43. Ind. R. App. P. 14(F)(2) (2002).
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CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, any expedition scheme will be
somewhat arbitrary, and cases viewed by some as being worthy
of expedited treatment will be excluded. Therefore, the most
equitable resolution of the problem may be to truly level the
playing field, maintaining the same deadlines for record
preparation and brief filing in all cases, while making general
efforts to hasten the process for all appeals. There is no
legitimate reason why it should take ninety days for a court
reporter to prepare most transcripts. The exceptionally long
transcript presents a good basis for an extension of time, but the
run-of-the-mill transcript could easily be prepared in forty-five
or even thirty days. 44 Even if the present briefing deadlines were
maintained (rather than shortened, which would likely meet
opposition from the appellate bar) but extensions were rarely
granted, most cases would arrive at the court of appeals within
five months. Considering the court's current level of efficiency
in rendering opinions,45 most litigants would likely have their
cases resolved within the following two months, thereby
resulting in a total length of delay shorter than that currently
existing in most expedited appeals.
Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any clamoring
among the bar, the public, or the bench to suggest that the
current expedition scheme is in need of any change, let alone a
major overhaul. As discussed above, however, the current
scheme is not particularly effective in meeting its desired goals
and some relatively minor changes in the appellate rules could
produce a system that truly expedites appeals in perhaps a more
equitable and just manner.
44. The current problem seems to be related to an existing backlog that prohibits court
reporters from beginning work on a transcript until well into the ninety-day period. If this
backlog were eliminated or reduced, shorter deadlines would be quite feasible.
45. See supra n. 13 and accompanying text.
